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Do law clerks influence U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions in the
Court’s agenda-setting stage? For those Justices responding to their own
law clerks’ cert recommendations, we expect a high degree of agreement
between Justice and clerk. For non-employing Justices, however, we
anticipate that the likelihood of agreement between clerk and Justice will
vary greatly based on the interplay among the ideological compatibility
between a Justice and the clerk, the underlying certworthiness of the
petition for review, and the clerk’s final recommendation. Relying on a
newly collected dataset of petitions making the Court’s discuss list over
the 1986 through 1993 Terms, we find that Justices are more likely to
follow a pool memo’s recommendation when it is consistent with the
underlying cues present in the pool memo. In addition, our results
indicate that Justices are significantly more likely to follow grant
recommendations when the recommendation is provided by a clerk from
an ideologically proximate chambers as opposed to one that is distant.
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These findings provide important information on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Court’s practice of pooling certiorari petitions among
chambers and also suggest that political advisors, at the Supreme Court
and in other institutions, are equipped to influence political elite decision
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Do law clerks influence U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions?
This question is of unquestionable import. In a 2012 study published in
American Politics Research, Black and Boyd examined this potential
influence of law clerks on U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decision making
in the Court’s agenda-setting stage.1 While their findings were strong—
indicating that law clerks serving in the Court’s certiorari (cert) pool
have conditional influence on Justice cert voting—the analysis was
based on limited data in terms of the number of observations and Court
Terms analyzed.2
Here, we return to this question with a much more expansive set of
data, an exercise that permits us to examine the robustness of these
earlier findings. Consistent with this earlier work, we argue that the
1. Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147 (2012).
2. See id. at 156, 164.
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influence of law clerks on Justices varies. For those Justices responding
to their own law clerks’ cert recommendations, we predict and find a
strong relationship and a high degree of agreement between Justice and
clerk. However, for non-employing Justices, we expect and find that the
likelihood of agreement between clerk and Justice will vary greatly
based on the interplay among three factors: (1) the ideological
compatibility between a Justice and the law clerk, (2) the underlying
certworthiness of the petition seeking review, and (3) the clerk’s final
recommendation to grant or deny review in a petition.
Relying on a newly collected dataset of all paid, non-death penalty
petitions making the Court’s discuss list over the course of eight Terms
(1986–1993) and drawn from the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun,3
the findings of our analysis are strong and robust. By way of preview,
we find that nearly 75% of all Justices’ agenda-setting votes in our data
match the recommendation made by the cert pool memo author. This
influence is not uniform, but rather conditioned by two important
factors: (1) Justices are significantly more likely to follow a pool memo’s
recommendation when that recommendation is consistent with the
underlying cues present in the pool memo; and (2) Justices are
significantly more likely to follow grant recommendations when the
recommendation is provided by a clerk from an ideologically proximate
chambers as opposed to one that is distant.
As we contend in this Article’s closing pages, these findings are
informative on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Court’s practice of
pooling certiorari petitions among the chambers. More generally, the
results, which we argue are generalizable across a variety of political
institutions, also suggest advisors can and do systematically influence the
decisions made by political elites. Our efforts proceed in several steps.
We begin by describing the advising role provided by clerks to their
Justices. We then turn to outlining our theories for the conditions under
which Justices should be influenced by law clerks—both their own (Part
III) and those of other Justices (Part IV). Part V takes these general
expectations and formulates them into specific empirically testable
hypotheses. Part VI describes our data, measures, and statistical results.
Finally, Part VII concludes with a discussion of the findings, some

3. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE DIGITAL ARCHIVE
PAPERS OF JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN (2007), http://epstein.wustl.edu/blackmu
n.php, archived at http://perma.cc/S5MQ-TPA9.

OF THE
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potential limitations, and what our results mean more generally for the
Supreme Court as an institution.
II. LAW CLERKS AS ADVISORS
A. Advisors in Politics
Since the 1920s, as the job of U.S. political elites has become more
complex, the number of individuals serving in advisory roles across the
branches has increased dramatically. In 1919, each legislator in the U.S.
Congress was authorized only two staff members, while current rules
allow for over twenty staffers per legislator, plus access to numerous
committee aides.4 Through 1918, U.S. Supreme Court Justices had
congressional authorization to hire one stenographic clerk;5 today, the
total staff size for an A ssociate Justice has more than tripled, including
the addition of three more clerks.6 The President’s staff, which numbers
near 2,000 today, was closer to 200 in the 1920s.7 If these numbers (and
their increase) are any indication, advisors are anything but trivial
members of federal politics.
The accounts of advisor influence and the roles that advisors assume
while serving in these national political institutions also seem to support
this conclusion. In Congress, advisors participate in policy development,
conduct research, draft legislation, and communicate and negotiate on
behalf of their member.8 In the White House, advisors develop policy
expertise and act as information filters for the chief executive when it
comes to their area of specialization.9 At the Supreme Court, the key
advisor role to Justices is played by law clerks, who serve at the pleasure
of their Justice and frequently take on a variety of tasks.10 For each of

4. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, S. REP. NO. 103-215, at
63 (1993).
5. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 83 (2006).
6. Id. at 186.
7. LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY: WASHINGTON TO
CLINTON 257 tbl.6-1 (1996).
8. HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE
INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 2 (1977).
9. See BRADLEY H. PATTERSON JR., THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE THE WEST
WING AND BEYOND 3 (2000).
10. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 14; ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3–4
(2006).
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these institutions, advisor numbers, knowledge of their responsibilities,
and anecdotes from advisors themselves give us ample reason to believe
that advisors play an important and influential role in our political
system. However, the extent of this influence and the conditions under
which it is operational generally remain a mystery.11
B. Law Clerks as Advisors at Certiorari
Supreme Court Justices’ law clerks, just like other advisors, serve in
a variety of capacities. Although there is substantial variation in how
Justices use their clerks, these advisors often conduct supplemental
research, draft pre-oral argument bench memoranda that summarize the
issues at stake in a case, and serve as the first—and perhaps only—line
of review for certiorari petitions.12 This lattermost duty is our focus.
Cert is “the process by which the [Supreme] Court [discretionarily]
sets its agenda.”13 It begins with the losing party in the lower court
arguing, via a written brief, why his case is worthy of further review.14
11. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 2. Much of this inattention in the existing literature to
systematic methods and generalizable results can be blamed not on a lack of recognition of
the role advisors play but rather on a lack of available data that can be used to assess
influence. The advising of legislators and presidents, for example, is often conducted through
informal and undocumented conversations where debate and decision making can take place.
Although these advisors author written position papers, which might then end up in archival
materials, the existence of this level of detail on decisions is rare and varies widely across
institutional setting. See DANIEL E. PONDER, GOOD ADVICE: INFORMATION & POLICY
MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 9 (2000); see also DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN
CONGRESS: MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION 28 (1995). That these
generally unrecorded conversations are most likely to take place between a decision maker
and her inner circle of advisors—the group most likely to exert influence—only compounds
the difficulty of documenting meaningful influence. In other cases, scholars turn to interviews
with advisors and their principals. In documenting the professional nature of congressional
staffers, Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer A. Utter conducted in-depth interviews of forty
current and former staffers. Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressional
Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerk?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1251, 1276 app. (1997).
Similar approaches have also been used for both the study of the President, PATTERSON,
supra note 9, at 8, and the Supreme Court, PEPPERS, supra note 5; WARD & WEIDEN, supra
note 10. These detailed narratives often provide extensive insight into the complex roles
advisors play, but fail to provide generalizable and systematic accounts of the influence of
political advisors on the decision making of their political principals.
12. See PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 14 for a thorough review of clerk duties.
13. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 21. We only provide a brief description of the
review process and how clerks are involved in it. Much of this and all other procedural
aspects of the Court’s business are explained in far greater detail in ROBERT L. STERN,
EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE (8th ed. 2002).
14. STERN ET AL., supra note 13, at 288.
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The cert petition and any accompanying materials are distributed to the
Justices’ individual chambers for their review.15 In the past, the review
process was a task each chambers engaged in individually, with these
duties falling primarily upon a Justice’s clerks.16 However, as the
number of petitions, particularly in forma pauperis (IFP) petitions (filed
by indigent litigants), coming to the Court steadily rose through the
1960s, many Justices began to worry about the amount of time their
clerks spent focused on only one activity,17 and with good reason:
Evidence indicates that during this era, many law clerks reviewed more
than eleven cert petitions per week, amounting to upwards of two-thirds
of their working time.18
This situation led to the development of the Court’s cert pool in
1972.19 The pool is a process whereby participating Justices combine
(pool) their clerks’ labor in the review of cert petitions so as to divide
the workload of summarizing the content and merit of each petition
coming to the Court.20 The pool’s creation had an appreciable effect on
clerk time. As Ward and Weiden indicate, following the cert pool’s
inception, the typical amount of workload a clerk spent on cert was
reduced to four to five petitions per week,21 thereby accounting for
about one-third of his or her time.22
With the cert pool in place, each new cert petition is randomly
assigned to one of the pool clerks, and that clerk is then responsible for

15. Id.
16. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 45.
17. Id. at 38–39, 138–42.
18. Id. at 137–42.
19. Id. at 45.
20. The decision to participate in the cert pool is one made by each individual Justice.
See id. at 147. At the time of the pool’s creation in 1972, Justices William J. Brennan, William
O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, and Potter Stewart did not participate. Id. at 119. Since
then, only Justice John Paul Stevens, id. at 147, and Justice Samuel Alito have opted out of
the pool, Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward, Introduction to IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 1, 7 (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus
Ward eds., 2012).
21. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 142.
22. This one-third time figure comes from the following evidence: “I would estimate
that cert petitions took up roughly a third of our work time. My guess is that this is more time
than the average cert pool clerk spent on petitions, but only slightly more.” Id. at 142
(quoting Sean Donahue, Behind the Pillars of Justice: Remarks on Law Clerks, 3 LONG TERM
VIEW 77, 79 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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producing a pool memorandum (pool memo) for that petition.23
Written in a standardized way, each memo contains a summary of the
case, the facts and proceedings below, and the parties’ arguments
(including any briefs filed amicus curiae); the clerk’s discussion of the
petition’s worthiness for review; and a recommendation regarding cert.24
The pool memo is then distributed to all Justices in the cert pool.25
Although the treatment of this memo varies by chambers, most Justices
have their clerks engage in some level of markup.26 In Justice
Blackmun’s chambers, for example, one of his clerks would review the
pool memo and then provide his or her own recommendation as to
whether the petition should be granted cert, along with anywhere from a
sentence to several pages of commentary.27 Following this markup
process, cert voting takes place at the Court’s weekly agenda-setting
conference.28
A number of compelling arguments make the cert stage a prime
candidate for assessing clerk influence. Perhaps chief among them is the
fact that the clerks themselves suggest that cert is where they have the
largest influence.29 In Ward and Weiden’s survey of former clerks, fully
38% indicated that the cert decision was the most likely occasion where
a clerk could change his Justice’s mind.30 By way of contrast, the same
survey revealed that only 4% of clerks believed that the ultimate
outcome of a case was the most likely area for influence.31 Additionally,
the large volume of petitions for review, the fact that clerks make
specific recommendations on cert, and the high degree of principal
oversight in other activities on the Court (such as the opinion-writing
process) suggest a comparatively high potential for clerk influence at the
cert stage. Ward and Weiden argue:

23. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 42 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 210; PERRY, supra note 23, at 60.
27. For many petitions this was as simple as noting agreement with the reasoning and
conclusion of the pool clerk. In others, however, the Blackmun clerk would write a
paragraph or more, at times simply adding to the pool memo writer’s logic while at others
arguing for a wholly different substantive outcome (e.g., grant instead of deny).
28. PERRY, supra note 23, at 43–44.
29. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 240.
30. Id. at 145 fig.3.
31. Id.
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Because clerks make formal recommendations on cert memos, it
is often thought that clerks have influence over cert decisions.
Indeed, not only do clerks make formal recommendations on
their cert memos, i.e., “GRANT” or “DENY,” but they also often
try to persuade in the body of the memo with political as well as
legal analyses. For example, when asked whether he often
attempted to convince his justice of his position on a case or
issue, a Douglas clerk from the 1960s said that he did not,
“except in cert memos.” Indeed, one way of viewing the cert
memo, and the mark-up memo in the case of pool memos, is that
the clerk is attempting to persuade the justices to either take the
case or not.32
Finally, unlike the other tasks that clerks may work on for their
Justices, we know that clerks serving in the cert pool have a role in the
cert process for every case that comes before the Court—regardless of
which Justice they work for.33 This consistency in job assignment makes
cert, and more generally, clerks, an ideal arena for examining advisor
influence in political decision making.
III. POLITICAL ELITES AS PRINCIPALS, ADVISORS AS AGENTS
To most, political advisor influence, even though it may not be
modeled, is assumed to exist.34 Given the enormous amount of
responsibilities that major political actors face, it is no wonder that they
turn to advisors to gather information, develop expertise, and, in certain
contexts, act on their behalves. This assumption of advisor influence,
then, is both reasonable and consistent with the delegation aspect of
principal–agency theory.35 As Kowert tells us, “It may be lonely at the
top, but hardly ever so lonely that important decisions in government
and business are made by only one person.”36 From a variety of
anecdotes, we know that advisors play an important role in making
highly important decisions across a variety of political institutions.
White House advisors craft future national foreign policy, congressional
32. Id. at 144.
33. PERRY, supra note 23, at 42.
34. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 35; see also JEAN A. GARRISON, GAMES
ADVISORS PLAY: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS, at
xviii–xix (1999).
35. See Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal–Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 203, 220–21 (2005).
36. PAUL A. KOWERT, GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK: WHEN DO LEADERS LEARN
FROM THEIR ADVISORS?, at 1 (2002).
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aides strike bargains over the text of a pending bill, and Supreme Court
clerks write initial drafts of controversial opinions.
While political principals are ultimately responsible for the decisions
that they make, they are unable to make those decisions alone. Simply
put, political actors “are most troubled by insufficient time and
information.”37 Enter the political advisor, whose existence and
substantial duties can be explained by sheer necessity. By acting as the
silent agent to presidents, legislators, and judges, advisors can specialize,
gain expertise, and provide information to their principals that will
enable multi-dimensional decision making that would not otherwise be
possible. Within this scenario, political principals can be likened to
managers of an enterprise.38
Of course, principal–agency theory demands that agents be properly
incentivized in order to be effective and not shirk.39 In the case of
advisors, both short-term and long-term reputation and career
considerations present a sizable incentive structure that helps prevent
shirking.40 In the short term, advisors may have vast discretion in doing
their jobs, but “such grants of discretion can always be recalled on a
moment’s notice, even retroactively.”41 Longer term, many of these
advisors have career goals that will keep them active in political- and
policy-related activities.42
With an effective principal–agent relationship in place, politicians
serving as enterprise managers can then delegate substantial activities to
their staffers, something that is necessary for modern-day political
success. Because actors in the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Branches are not equipped to manage every minute detail of their
position or to personally acquire the information necessary to make the
most of the administrative and policy-making decisions required of

37. H. Owen Porter, Legislative Information Needs and Staff Resources in the American
States, in LEGISLATIVE STAFFING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39, 40 (James J. Heaphey
& Alan P. Balutis eds., 1975).
38. Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the
Ties-That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 382 (1981).
39. Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979);
Miller, supra note 35, at 204; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
40. See Romzek & Utter, supra note 11, at 1260, 1263.
41. Id. at 1260.
42. Id.
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them, political principals delegate a variety of tasks to advisors,43 some
of which are routine and others that approach policy making.44 Advisors
are frequently considered area experts by their bosses, a structure that,
when served by incentivized agents in a well-designed system, provides
an effective method of controlling the “chaotic informational
environment”45 through filtering and delivering information to
principals. The same system also increases the possibilities for advisors
to serve in critical and important roles in politics. Thus, the very design
of this advisory system explains not only the existence of a sizable
contingent of advisors and staff surrounding modern political decision
makers but also the presence of vast potential for advisors to influence
governmental policy.
In the context of law clerks as advisors to Justices, in hiring a law
clerk to work for her, a Justice is entrusting the clerk to work on her
behalf and provide assistance as she works to pursue her goals. More
generally, this includes a Justice’s desire “to see [her] policy preferences
etched into law.”46 What is more, from a theoretical perspective, we
have several reasons to believe that a Justice is equipped to ensure
dutiful and loyal work among her own law clerks. These reasons include
the Justice’s control over the selection of law clerks, her ability to audit
law clerk decisions and activities, and her ability to incentivize loyalty
through influence on post-clerkship employment opportunities.
Turning first to a Justice’s selection of her law clerks, each Justice
has complete discretion with regards to the process used to select clerks
and the outcome of that process—i.e., who ultimately gets selected.47
This creates the ability for a Justice, alone and through her existing staff
of advisors, to develop a detailed understanding of the applicants, their
43. See, e.g., Andrew Rudalevige, The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies,
and Information Flow, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 333, 338 (2005).
44. Id. at 338, 344. We are not the first to suggest using a principal–agency approach to
understanding law clerks. Sally J. Kenney has deployed such a perspective in her work on
clerks at the Court and on reférendaires, the law clerk counterpart in the European Court of
Justice. Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by
Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S.
Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593 (2000); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents?
What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S.
Supreme Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185 (2000) (reviewing EDWARD LAZARUS,
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT (1998)).
45. Rudalevige, supra note 43, at 335.
46. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–10 (1998).
47. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 108.
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personalities and talents, and to select only those individuals who she
can trust will pursue her agenda and policy goals.48 Information such as
law school attended, grades and course work, letters of
recommendation, group membership, writing samples, and lower court
clerkships can be critical for the reliability of the results of this selection
process.49
Upon hiring a law clerk, a Justice can monitor her work by
auditing.50 Whether the clerk reviews cert petitions, writes bench
memoranda, or authors early drafts of opinions, the employing Justice
still has access to the raw materials from which the clerk drew.51 Beyond
this, incentives for clerks to impress their employing Justice are high.
Faithful, reliable clerks are likely to receive strong post-clerkship
employment support.52 Supreme Court clerkships are tremendous
accomplishments for attorneys, carrying with them great potential for
hiring bonuses, high salaries, prestige, and opportunities.53 Being held in
low regard by one’s former Justice would surely decrease these postclerkship opportunities and benefits.
These tools of selection and control give us good reason to believe
that the clerk–Justice employment relationship is a strong one that fits
well within the principal–agency theoretical framework. Because of the
strength of this relationship, we expect that there will be great similarity
between what a Justice would have done herself and what her clerk does
as her agent. And due to this, in the context of cert, we expect that
Justices will closely follow the recommendations of their own clerks.
IV. SIGNALING THEORY:
LAW CLERK INFLUENCE IN NON-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
A Supreme Court clerk’s interactions, work, and potential for
influence are generally limited to her employing Justice. However, the
existence of the cert pool facilitates unique interactions between clerks
and non-employing Justices because a law clerk’s pool memo and
48. See id. at 107.
49. Id. at 55–56; Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and
Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869, 870–71 (2001); Todd C. Peppers &
Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical
Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 55 (2008).
50. Peppers & Ward, supra note 20, at 9.
51. See id.
52. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 1.
53. Id. at 1, 55.
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recommendation are distributed to and relied upon by chambers other
than that of her own Justice.54 While all pool Justices receive the same
memo, only the Justice who originally hired the law clerk has the ability
to use the direct supervision tools described above. For example,
Justice O’Connor had no influence in selecting or overseeing the clerks
hired by Justice Thomas. As a result, we must look beyond principal–
agency theory to what is known as signaling theory55 to offer predictions
on how non-employing Justices will respond to cert pool
recommendations.56 Signaling theory permits the exploration of a
communication between a sender and a receiver in which the sender
holds an informational advantage over the receiver. Under the theory,
as the interests of the sender and receiver move further apart, the value
of the communication (i.e., the signal) decreases.57
In our context, the signaling model depends on the communication
of information through the pool memo from a sender (here, the pool
clerk) to the receiver (here, each Justice serving in the pool). As with
the agent in principal–agency theory, the clerk in signaling theory has a
significant informational advantage over the receiving Justices. During
the cert pool process, the pool clerk reads the complete record of a case,
including the litigants’ briefs and any lower court opinions, all of which
inform the content of his resulting pool memos and the signal that is
sent with it.58 Since the interests and loyalty of the signal-sending pool
clerk and the signal-receiving pool Justice do not always align, the
reliability of the communication through this signaling process is not
always of high value.
As such, after the Justices in the pool receive the cert
recommendation, they must account for the potential that the pool

54. PERRY, supra note 23, at 42.
55. Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1431, 1432–33 (1982).
56. In recent years, signaling theory has been used to understand other Supreme Courtrelated relationships, including the interactions between Justices and the Solicitor General,
Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: The
Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI.
72 (2005), and the Supreme Court’s overall decision to grant or deny cert, Ryan C. Black &
Ryan J. Owens, Consider the Source (and the Message): Supreme Court Justices and Strategic
Audits of Lower Court Decisions, 65 POL. RES. Q. 385 (2012); Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey
A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational
Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000).
57 Crawford & Sobel, supra note 55, at 1431–33.
58. STERN ET AL., supra note 13, at 39.
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memo’s recommendation made by the law clerk might be wrong or
incomplete. Such signaling “errors” might be related to the clerk’s skill
at interpreting the private information or could be deliberate efforts to
influence the receiver. Because examining the record directly himself to
check the quality and accuracy of the pool recommendation in every
case would be prohibitively time-consuming, a Justice must turn to
informational shortcuts to accomplish this assessment.
In this process, we believe that Justices rely on a handful of readily
available sources in making this determination: (1) the presence of
critical informational cues about the underlying quality of a cert
petition; (2) the direction of the clerk’s pool recommendation (grant,
deny); and (3) the compatibility of the political preferences between a
receiving Justice and the pool clerk. In addition to the information
available to a Justice to assess pool recommendation reliability, we also
expect that his need to rely on the recommendations of the cert pool will
vary based on the length of his tenure on the Court.
Key elements of a case being petitioned to the Court for cert can
serve as important informational cues that influence Justices’ cert
voting.59 This critical information includes things such as whether the
petition involves a circuit conflict or an important national matter,
whether there was a dissenting opinion in the lower court, or whether
there is an IFP petitioner in the case.60 Petitions with many positive cues
should be better cert candidates for Justices (i.e., more certworthy) than
those with fewer positive cues or more negative cues.61
These informational cues are likely to operate in connection with the
pool clerk’s grant/deny recommendation for each petition. Simply put,
we expect that Justices will be more likely to follow clerk
recommendations when they align with the signal sent through the
petition’s level of certworthiness. If a petition is considered certworthy
and the clerk recommends granting it, then this recommendation should
be more likely to be followed than if the law clerk recommends denying
the same high quality petition. The opposite (higher likelihood of
following deny recommendations for non-certworthy petitions) should
hold as well. This means, for example, that a Justice would be more
likely to follow a grant recommendation for the petition with conflict
59. Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin & Daniel Rosen, The
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111,
118 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).
60. Id. at 115–17.
61. Id. at 118.
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and a deny recommendation for the petition submitted by an indigent.
As we argue above, individual law clerks should behave according to
the preferences of their employing Justices. This ideologically driven
behavior will be consistent with the preferences of some outside
chambers, but it is likely to be far from the preferences of others.
Indeed, when the ideological distance between a Justice and the
chambers of the pool clerk’s Justice is high, the quality of the cert pool
signal will be doubted, and the receiving Justice should be less likely to
follow that recommendation. Our theory thus predicts that Justice
Scalia would, all else equal, reject a recommendation from one of
Justice Ginsburg’s law clerks while accepting a recommendation from
one of Justice Thomas’s law clerks.
To further complicate matters, we expect that, because Justices are
forward looking and policy conscious in the cert votes,62 the abovenoted importance of ideological distance and the relationship between a
petition’s certworthiness and the type of recommendation that a pool
clerk makes will themselves be interrelated. When faced with a petition
that (1) is of high quality (i.e., is certworthy) and (2) has received a grant
recommendation from the pool clerk, a Justice should be more likely to
follow that recommendation when the policy preferences of the pool
clerk are similar to the voting Justice’s own preferences. Applying this
expectation once again to sitting Justices in our data, even if the petition
is of high quality and the pool clerk recommends granting review,
Justice Scalia would still potentially discount a recommendation coming
from a pool clerk hailing from Justice Marshall’s ideologically distant
chambers.
Beyond these relationships, we also expect that a Justice’s
propensity to follow a clerk’s recommendation will be driven, in part, by
his level of experience and familiarity with the Court. Consistent with
previous research on the Court indicating that a Justice’s behavior varies
across his Supreme Court tenure,63 this cert-related expectation
recognizes that newly appointed Justices need time to become

62. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1063 (2009); Gregory A. Caldeira, John
R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme
Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 550 (1999).
63. Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshman Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1142 (1993); Mark S. Hurwitz & Joseph V. Stefko, Acclimation and Attitudes:
“Newcomer” Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 121
(2004).
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accustomed to the Court’s unique workload, norms, culture, and
responsibilities. In the context of cert, relatively new Justices are likely
to lean more heavily on cert pool recommendations than their senior
colleagues in deciding how to vote in the Court’s agenda-setting stage.
V. HYPOTHESES
The above detailed theories give rise to the following four
hypotheses64:
• Hypothesis 1: Pool clerk recommendations to deny noncertworthy petitions should be more likely to be followed than
grant recommendations of similarly non-certworthy petitions.
• Hypothesis 2: Pool clerk recommendations to grant certworthy
petitions should be more likely to be followed than deny
recommendations of similarly certworthy petitions.
• Hypothesis 3: Pool clerk recommendations to grant certworthy
petitions should be more likely to be followed by Justices
ideologically similar to the recommending pool clerk.
• Hypothesis 4: The less time a Justice has served on the Court, the
more likely he should be to follow a pool clerk’s cert
recommendation.
VI. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To further probe the nature of clerk influence at cert in this
replication project, we analyzed a subset of the petitions considered by
the Court. We started by examining the conference discuss lists for the
Court’s 1986–1993 Terms, which we obtained from the archival papers
of Justice Blackmun at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.
The discuss list identifies what petitions received a recorded vote at the
agenda-setting stage. Although the Chief Justice is responsible for
circulating the first draft of the discuss list, any Justice can ask to have a
petition added to it.65 Petitions not making the discuss list are denied

64. These hypotheses align closely with hypotheses 1a–1c and 2 in the 2012 paper that
we are replicating. Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 155–56. As we discuss in further detail
below, we do not have the data necessary in this project to model the procedural complexity
hypothesis from the 2012 paper. See infra note 79.
65. Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, Selecting the Select Few: The Discuss List and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1124, 1126 (2013).
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without a formal vote.66
Discuss lists in hand, we then made several data-winnowing steps.
First, we removed all petitions seeking review of a death penalty
sentence.67 Second, we included only paid petitions.68 Third, we
included only petitions coming from a federal court of appeals or federal
district court.69 All told, the data used for our analysis consist of 9,531
Justice votes cast across 1,081 petitions. By way of comparison, the
original Black and Boyd 2012 study examined 305 petitions containing
just over 2,000 Justice votes.70
Our dependent variable is whether there is agreement between the
law clerk’s pool memo recommendation on cert and the final cert vote
cast by a Justice serving in the cert pool. A dichotomous measure, this
variable is coded as 1 when a law clerk recommends grant and the
voting Justice votes to grant or when a law clerk recommends deny and
the voting Justice votes to deny.71 In other scenarios (e.g., clerk
66. Id. The process by which petitions are selected for the discuss list is not, of course,
random. See id. Rather it is the Court’s first chance to winnow the pool of cases to a more
manageable number by eliminating those that are clearly without merit. See id. One might
be concerned that, by selecting only petitions that have already cleared this bar, our analysis
will have some degree of a selection bias. While there is undoubtedly some bias, we believe it
actually causes us to understate the true nature of law clerk influence.
67. During most of the Terms analyzed, the Court had a distinct cert review process for
capital cases which automatically added them to the discuss list. See EDWARD LAZARUS,
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
119–22 (Penguin Books 2005) (1998). When the Court voted on whether to grant cert in
these petitions, it was the standing policy of Justices Marshall and Brennan to vote to grant
the petition, vacate the death penalty sentence, and remand the case for further proceedings.
LAZARUS, supra, at 159; see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 205–08 (1979).
68. This is consistent with the vast majority of agenda-setting studies, which argue that
unpaid (i.e., in forma pauperis) petitions are of substantially less merit than their paid
counterparts. See, e.g., Black & Owens, supra note 62, at 1065 n.4; Gregory A. Caldeira &
John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1116 (1988). But see Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, U.S. Supreme
Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 286, 288 n.2
(2012).
69. The data we use here were collected as part of a larger project on the policy
influences on agenda setting. This separate project requires that we place lower court judges
and Supreme Court Justices in the same ideological space. The Judicial Common Space
allows us to compare preferences of Justices and lower court judges. Lee Epstein, Andrew D.
Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 303, 305–06 (2007). At present, however, no analogous procedure exists for state court
judges. This data loss is not, however, especially worrisome since nearly three-fourths of all
petitions come from the lower federal courts.
70. Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 156.
71. We follow Harold J. Spaeth and code a Justice’s vote as “grant” when she actually
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recommends granting review and a Justice votes to deny), this variable
is coded as 0. Obtained from Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth,72 these clerk
recommendations and Justice votes were coded from the pool memos
and Justice Blackmun’s docket sheets, respectively, which existing
research has shown to be a reliable and valid indicator of the Justices’
agenda-setting behavior.73
To test our four hypotheses, we need independent variables to
capture the direction of the clerk’s recommendation, a petition’s
certworthiness, the ideological distance between the recommending
clerk and the voting Justice, and the length of the voting Justice’s tenure
on the Court.
To isolate whether the impact of a clerk’s
recommendation only matters in, for example, petitions of high
certworthiness, we further interact the first three of these variables
together (i.e., direction, certworthiness, and ideological distance). We
describe each of these measures in turn.
Clerk Recommendation takes on a value of 1 when the pool memo
recommends grant and 0 when the memo recommends deny. The pool
clerk recommended denying in approximately 70% of our petitions and
granting in the remaining 30%.74
To operationalize Certworthiness, we follow the practice from our
2012 piece and develop a summary measure that captures the
meaningful informational cues found by scores of scholars of the Court’s
cert process over the years.75 To do this, we first estimate a logistic
voted to grant and also when she voted to “Join-3,” something that becomes a grant vote if
there are three other grant votes. HAROLD J. SPAETH, EXPANDED BURGER COURT
JUDICIAL
DATABASE
(1969–1985),
at
v
(2008),
available
at
http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/burger_codebook.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/BDX8-HYPQ. Our results remain the same if we recode Join-3 votes as
missing data.
72. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3.
73. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Analyzing the Reliability of Supreme Court
Justices’ Agenda-Setting Records, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 254 (2009).
74. Note that we “coarsen” the specific language of a pool clerk’s recommendation to
make this value dichotomous. That is, although when making a recommendation the most
common language is to simply say “Deny” (or “Grant”), the pool clerk will, on occasion,
hedge her recommendation by saying “Close, but deny” or “Weak grant.” We pool the
close/weak recommendations with their “strong” counterparts.
75. Tanenhaus, et al., supra note 59, at 118; see also Jennifer Barnes Bowie & Donald R.
Songer, Assessing the Applicability of Strategic Theory to Explain Decision Making on the
Courts of Appeals, 62 POL. RES. Q. 393, 393 (2009); Caldeira et al., supra note 62, at 570;
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 68, at 1109, 1116; S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze & Louise
Kirklosky, The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory, 6
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 642 (1972).
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regression model at the petition level that includes variables that tap into
legal conflict, the United States’ position, lower court decision
We then calculate
characteristics, and petition characteristics.76
predicted probabilities for each of these petitions and use those values
in our variable. The variable has an observed range of 0.07 through
1.00, with a mean of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.29.
Ideological Distance is coded as the absolute value of the difference
between a voting Justice’s Judicial Common Space score77 and the score
of the pool writer’s parent Justice for the Term.78 Thus, when measuring
the distance between a Justice and his own clerk, this variable takes on a
value of 0.
Justice Tenure is measured as the number of years that a Justice had
been on the bench before casting her agenda-setting vote in the case at
hand.79
Finally, we also include Justice fixed effects. These consist of a
single dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 for each of the
Justices in our data. Fixed effects allow us to determine, for example, if
Justice Thomas was simply more likely, even after controlling for all
other variables in our model, to follow recommendations from the pool
memo than say Justice Ginsburg.80
A. Methods and Results
Our dependent variable—whether we observe agreement between
the pool clerk’s recommendation and a Justice’s final agenda-setting
76. The results from this logistic regression are reported in the Appendix, infra.
77. See Epstein et al., supra note 69, at 305–06.
78. This represents a minor departure from the original 2012 American Politics
Research paper, where we use a Justice’s Martin-Quinn score. See Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). See supra note 69 for additional
discussion about why we are using Judicial Common Space scores in this present project. In
any event, the bivariate correlation between the two measures is above 0.95 (p < 0.001), which
means the two measures are nearly identical.
79. Due to data limitations, this study omits one variable and its related hypothesis that
was present in the 2012 study. The omitted variable, Procedural Complexity, was
“operationalize[d] as the proportion of pages in a cert pool memo that were devoted to
discussing the facts of the case and proceedings of the lower court(s).” Black & Boyd, supra
note 1, at 157. The hypothesis related to this variable was designed to capture complex
underlying cases that would likely lead to Justices being increasingly likely to turn to a case’s
underlying material themselves rather than relying on a clerk’s recommendation. Id. In the
2012 study, Black and Boyd found no statistical support for this expectation. Id. at 164.
80. The original 2012 study did not, due to a limited number of observations, include
these controls. See Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 156–57.
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vote—is dichotomous, so we estimate a logistic regression model. To
allay potential concerns about a lack of independence across our
observations, we calculate and assess statistical significance using robust
standard errors. Because our model includes multiple interaction terms,
the normal table of parameter estimates is essentially useless in
informing us about the relationships among our variables.81 Thus, we
move directly to using stochastic simulations to illustrate our results.82
We begin with Figure 1, which shows the results for Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1 argued that Justices should be more
likely to follow recommendations to deny as opposed to grant when the
petition is of low certworthiness.83 Similarly, Hypothesis 2 argued that
Justices should be more likely to follow recommendations of grant as
opposed to deny when the petition has a high level of facial
certworthiness.84 We find strong support for both of these hypotheses.
Figure 1 is divided into two panels. The left panel corresponds to a
petition with a low level of certworthiness, which we define as being the
tenth percentile value in our sample data or roughly a 10% baseline
chance of being granted review. Within the plot, the square point
denotes the estimated probability that a Justice follows the pool clerk’s
recommendation when that recommendation is to deny the petition.
The circle point shows that analogous probability if the law clerk were
to recommend granting review in the petition. Consistent with our
expectation, we find that a Justice is more than twice as likely to follow
a law clerk’s recommendation to deny than she is to follow a
recommendation to grant. The predicted probability of agreement for a
low certworthy petition accompanied by a deny recommendation is 0.86,
compared to a probability of only 0.37 when that same petition is
accompanied by a grant recommendation.

81. See generally Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and
Probit Models, 80 ECON. LETTERS 123 (2003); William D. Berry, Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt
& Justin Esarey, Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term
Essential?, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 248 (2010); Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & Matt
Golder, Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS
63 (2006); Tsung-han Tsai & Jeff Gill, Interactions in Generalized Linear Models: Theoretical
Issues and an Application to Personal Vote-Earning Attributes, 2 SOC. SCI. 91 (2013).
82. See infra Appendix for a table of parameter estimates that underlie these
simulations.
83. See supra Part V.
84. See supra Part V.
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Low Certworthiness

High Certworthiness
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Figure 1
Effect of Certworthiness and Clerk
Recommendation on Likelihood of Agreement
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Note: Low and high certworthiness correspond to petitions with a 0.10 and a 0.80
probability of being granted review, which are the tenth and ninetieth percentile
values in our data, respectively. The square mark shows the point estimate and the
vertical whisker denotes the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed). All other
variables were held at their mean or median values, as appropriate.
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The right panel increases the level of certworthiness for the petition
being reviewed. In particular, we now use the ninetieth percentile value
in our data, which corresponds to roughly a 0.84 probability of seeing
the Court grant review in the petition. The square point again denotes
the likelihood of agreement when the clerk recommends denying the
petition and the circle point shows the likelihood of agreement when the
clerk recommends granting it. In such a petition, we estimate a 0.48
probability of agreement if a clerk were to recommend denying it
compared with a 0.75 probability of agreement if the clerk were to
suggest granting the petition—a relative change of more than 55%.
Both of these empirical results are consistent with our expectations.
Although law clerks have an informational advantage when it comes to
knowing the quality of a petition, the cert pool format compels them to
disclose a substantial portion of that information, which the Justices are
able to observe. Thus, recommendations that are consistent with the
underlying cues in a petition are more likely to be followed than those
that seem incongruous with the petition’s quality.
We next consider our third hypothesis. Here, we argued that when
considering a pool clerk recommendation to grant review, a Justice
would be more likely to follow that recommendation when it came from
a pool clerk whose chambers was ideologically proximate to (as opposed
to distant from) the Justice.85 More concretely, Justice Thomas should
view a grant recommendation from one of Justice Scalia’s law clerks
more favorably than the same recommendation from one of Justice
Ginsburg’s clerks.
Figure 2 shows the results we obtain for this hypothesis. Along the
x-axis we show the certworthiness of a petition, which ranges from very
low on the far left (i.e., 0.10) to very high on the far right (i.e., 1.0). The
y-axis shows what we might think of as the “home chambers advantage.”
This is the difference in the probability of a Justice following a clerk’s
recommendation when the clerk is from her own chambers (and
ideological distance is equal to zero) versus when the clerk is from a
chambers that is ideologically distant (we use the distance between
Justice Thomas and Justice Blackmun). Positive values, therefore,
indicate that a Justice is more likely to follow her own clerk’s
recommendation as opposed to the recommendation from a more
distant chambers.

85. See supra Part V.
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Figure 2
Effect of Ideological Agreement and Clerk
Recommendation on Likelihood of Agreement
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Note: The solid horizontal lines show the point estimate and the vertical whiskers
denote the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed). All other variables were held at
their mean or median values, as appropriate.
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Within the plot itself we show two lines. The top line denotes the
home chambers advantage when the clerk recommends granting review.
The bottom line, by contrast, shows the difference when the clerk
recommends denying the petition. Both of these lines are accompanied
by a series of vertical line segments, which express our uncertainty
around the point estimate. When these segments cross the dashed
horizontal line located at zero, then we can say that no significant home
chambers advantage exists. Conversely, if the lines do not cross that
dashed zero line, then we can be confident a systematic effect exists.
Starting with the top line, which corresponds to a recommendation
of grant, we see a consistent and substantial home chambers advantage
across all values of petition certworthiness. Take, for example, a
petition with a coin-flip likelihood of being granted review. Under the
circumstance, we estimate that a grant recommendation coming from a
Justice’s own clerk will have a 40% higher chance of being followed
than if that same recommendation were to come from an ideologically
distant chambers.86 Importantly, we find that this difference persists
even in instances when a petition is either very unlikely to be granted
review (i.e., low certworthiness) or very likely to be granted review (i.e.,
high certworthiness). Indeed, the effect size never becomes smaller than
a 0.31 agreement advantage afforded to a Justice’s own clerk.
Although we find a substantial and persistent effect for grant
recommendations, as the bottom line of the figure indicates, we do not
find such an effect for deny recommendations. A Justice is slightly more
likely to follow her own clerk’s deny recommendation when a petition is
of very low certworthiness (a probability difference of about 0.04). This
small effect quickly becomes statistically insignificant, however, as we
move up to higher levels of certworthiness. Indeed, the point estimate
for very high values of certworthiness actually becomes negative, which
would suggest that a Justice is more likely to follow an ideologically
distant clerk’s recommendation over her own clerk’s.87

86. The specific agreement probabilities are 0.72 (own clerk) versus 0.32 (ideologically
distant clerk).
87. We are unable to push this point too far, however, given the large width of our
confidence intervals. The difference is still statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level but
would be statistically significant at the 0.20 level (all two-tailed tests), which has been used by
some as the threshold for accepting the null hypothesis. See Timothy R. Johnson, James F.
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 364 tbl.3 (2005).
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Finally, although we fail to find support for our judicial tenure
hypothesis,88 we do recover some significant differences for our Justice
fixed effects. That is, even after controlling for the factors in our model,
we find that some variation in whether a Justice follows a law clerk’s
recommendation can be attributed to the specific identity of the Justice
him or herself.89 Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of these Justice-level
differences. Along the x-axis we show the likelihood of a Justice
following a law clerk’s recommendation in an average cert petition,
which we operationalize as one with a 0.42 probability of being granted
review where the clerk recommends denial. Ideological distance is held
at its mean value. The y-axis shows each of the thirteen Justices in our
data. The square points denote the likelihood a Justice follows the
clerk’s recommendation and the horizontal whiskers express our (often
considerable) uncertainty around the point estimates.
Upon initial examination, it appears as though Justice Ginsburg is
the most likely to follow recommendations from the pool memo. As the
width of the horizontal whisker indicates, however, there is a substantial
amount of uncertainty around that estimate. This stems from the fact
that we have only twenty-one observations for Justice Ginsburg in our
data.
Although she ended up following the pool writer’s
recommendation in eighteen of those observations (about 86%), we can
only say that the rate at which she followed clerk recommendations is
significantly larger than the rate of her predecessor, Justice White, who
followed around 63% of cert pool recommendations.90

88. See supra Part V; infra Appendix Table 2.
89. We made this determination by comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) values for a simple model that did not include Justice fixed effects versus the more
complicated model that did include them. The BIC for the more complicated model was
9,875 compared to a BIC of 9,891 for the simple model. This difference (of 16) provides
“very strong” evidence to prefer the fixed effects model over the pooled one. See J. SCOTT
LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT
VARIABLES USING STATA 113 (2d ed. 2006).
90. See the caption, supra Figure 3, for a complete listing of all other significant
differences.
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Figure 3
Effect of Justice Identity on Likelihood of Agreement
Ginsburg
Thomas
Powell
Blackmun
Kennedy
Souter
Marshall
Scalia
Brennan
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Stevens
White
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Note: The square mark shows the point estimate and the horizontal whisker denotes
the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed). The petition characteristics were held
constant at 0.42 certworthiness, deny recommendation, and an average amount of
ideological distance. The 22 significant Justice differences (out of 78 possible, p <
0.05, two-tailed test) are: Blackmun > Stevens, Blackmun > White, Brennan >
White, Ginsburg > White, Kennedy > Rehnquist, Kennedy > Stevens, Kennedy >
White, Marshall > Stevens, Marshall > White, O’Connor > Stevens, O’Connor >
White, Powell > Stevens, Powell > White, Scalia > Rehnquist, Souter > Rehnquist,
Thomas > Rehnquist, Scalia > Stevens, Scalia > White, Souter > Stevens, Souter >
White, Thomas > Stevens, Thomas > White.
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Readers familiar with the cert pool might be curious to see the
presence of three Justices in Figure 3. In particular, we have estimates
for the probability that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would
follow a pool clerk’s recommendation. Such estimates might be
puzzling given that none of these Justices participated in the cert pool
during their time on the Court.91 Why, then, do we include them in our
analysis? Although non-participating Justices do not receive their own
copies of the cert pool memos,92 it is likely that their law clerks are,
through the law clerk network,93 aware of what the pool memo has
recommended in most petitions—especially those that are on the
discuss list and are thus viable candidates for receiving a cert grant.
Indeed, Perry, in his seminal book on agenda setting, is told by his
informants that non-pool clerks would “go swimming” in cert pool
memos to look for guidance in making recommendations for their own,
non-pool Justice.94
From our perspective, then, the question of whether the cert pool
influenced a non-pool Justice is both empirical and one that, to the best
of our knowledge, no published research has examined. If the extent of
“pool swimming” by non-pool clerks was limited, then we should expect
to find non-pool Justices as being among the least likely to follow a pool
clerk’s recommendation. If, by contrast, it was more widespread, then
non-pool Justices should be statistically similar to the pool Justices. Our
results suggest the answer is somewhere between these two extremes.
Justice Stevens, for example, has the second lowest probability of
following a clerk’s recommendation.95 His other non-pool colleagues,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, fall more towards the middle of the
pack.96 As we note in the caption to Figure 3, although we can conclude
that a significant difference exists between Justices Marshall and
Stevens, we cannot conclude that such a difference exists between either
Justices Brennan and Marshall or Justices Stevens and Brennan.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

PERRY, supra note 23, at 42.
See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 45.
Id. at 164–65.
PERRY, supra note 23, at 54 (quoting Interview with C2, Unidentified Law Clerk).
See infra Appendix Table 2.
See infra Appendix Table 2.
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VII. DISCUSSION
A. Placing the Results in Context
Previous research on the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process,
though not ignoring law clerks, has often failed to systematically
incorporate their role into models of judicial behavior. As we have
argued in the past, this omission provides an incomplete picture of the
Court’s discretionary decision making in this important stage.97 Black
and Boyd began the task of tackling this research in their 2012 study,
finding evidence that a pool “clerk’s cert recommendation interacts with
the quality of the [cert] petition and the comparative ideology of the
voting Justice” to explain when Justices will agree with the pool clerk.98
While their evidence was strong, the results were based on a relatively
limited time frame (only four Terms) and a small sample of data (just
over 300 petitions). Our primary goal in this Article was to replicate
and extend their study to see if the results held after examining a larger
number of Court Terms and bigger set of petitions. Importantly, the
type of replication and extension exercise conducted here is encouraged
in social science research.99
Indeed, renowned political science
methodologist Gary King urges the replication of “existing studies to
understand, evaluate, and especially build on” the previous work.100
Our results largely confirm those found by Black and Boyd in their
2012 paper. To summarize, we find a substantial level of agreement
between what law clerks recommend in the pool memos and how
Justices ultimately vote. Indeed, roughly 75% of the more than 9,500
votes in our data follow the recommendation made by the law clerk.
The influence of law clerks on Justices is neither constant nor random,
however. Rather, our analysis suggests that Justices compare the law
clerk’s recommendation with their own prior belief about a petition’s
certworthiness.101 Recommendations that are consistent with those
beliefs are substantially more likely to be followed than those that
challenge them.
Additionally, in the event that a pool clerk
recommends granting review in a petition—an event that occurs about
31% of the time in our data—a voting Justice also considers the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 164.
Id.
See Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444 (1995).
Id. at 444.
See infra Appendix Table 2.
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ideology of the clerk’s supervising Justice.
When a Justice is
ideologically proximate to a clerk’s employing Justice, we find that the
voting Justice is more than twice as likely to follow that
recommendation than when the Justice is ideologically distant. Taken
together with the findings from our original study, these results provide
strong evidence of the conditional influence that law clerks can have in
the Court’s agenda-setting process. These clerks are not just spending a
lot of time reviewing cert petitions, something that we estimated above
to be approximately one-third of their work load,102 but they are
wielding potential influence on their own employing Justices and other
Justices while doing so.
B. Normative Implications for the Cert Pool
Our present findings, coupled with those previously obtained by
Black and Boyd, provide what may be very important normative
implications of the existence of the institutionalized cert pool. Recall
that, from its inception in 1972, the cert pool implored law clerks to
author “objective” memos.103
While our research confirms the
standardization of the memos’ formatting, it paints a very different
picture regarding the content of the memos, particularly with regard to
the conclusions drawn.
As we summarize above, grant
recommendations are treated differently when coming from a clerk who
hails from an ideological ally as opposed to a foe. This may not be
surprising, especially given what we know about the strength of the
principal–agent relationship between a Justice and his hired clerk.
It does, however, call into question whether the cert pool was, just
over a decade after its inception, serving its intended goals. To the
extent bias exists in the recommendations, a pool Justice needs to
devote additional effort to detect and correct for that bias before she
can cast her agenda-setting vote. If this work is being delegated to a
Justice’s law clerk, which seems very likely, then we must ask, how much
of an efficiency gain is there over simply having one’s own law clerks do
an independent review? Interestingly, our results suggest that the
answer to this question will depend upon the ideological composition of
the Court and, in particular, a Justice’s location on the Court. If a
Justice is one of the more extreme members of the Court, then grant
recommendations from either proximate or distant chambers are
102. See supra notes 22 and accompanying text.
103. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 118.
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informative—you follow those from allies and do the opposite of those
coming from ideologically distant chambers. Paradoxically, however, a
Justice in the middle stands to gain far less from either end of the
spectrum and, as a result, would likely need to invest more of her clerk’s
time to determine what the most appropriate vote would be. This newly
revealed nuance thus opens the door for more empirical and normative
scholarship assessing the value and efficiency of the cert pool for all
participating members of the Court.
C. Generalizing About Advisors Beyond the Supreme Court
As we have already argued, the activities of law clerks during the
U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process provide an excellent
setting for systematically and empirically testing for advisor influence.104
Although we recognize that Supreme Court law clerks are not precisely
analogous to advisors in the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
federal government, we believe that in many ways, the similarities
between these staffers outweigh the differences, particularly when
examining the existence and conditionality of their influence. These
similarities range across the education and experience of the people that
fill the jobs, the motivations that drive the employees, and the tasks that
they are asked to perform while serving in their staff positions.105
Law clerks are regarded as being among the brightest and most
talented young legal minds.106 Modern clerks typically come from the
top of their class at an elite law school and often have experience
clerking for a federal trial or appellate judge.107 Similar language has
also been used to describe congressional advisors.108 White House
staffers, particularly those that serve close to the President, tend to be
more experienced (and older) than congressional and court advisors, but
the positions held by all three groups are highly coveted and can lead to
uncountable future opportunities—both inside and outside of
Washington.109
In addition to similar backgrounds, key advisors to presidents,
legislators, and Justices tend to be selected with many of the same
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Black & Boyd, supra note 1; see also supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.
See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 1.
Id. at 55.
See,
e.g.,
MICHAEL
J.
MALBIN,
UNELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES:
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 20 (1979).
109. See id. at 21–23.
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characteristics in mind. Presidents generally choose only those who
have demonstrated personal loyalty and trustworthiness to them and
their partisan ideals to serve in close advisory positions.110 Although the
criteria for choosing lower level White House staffers is less careful and
precise, no one can serve the President without some demonstrated
dedication to the office.111 Members of Congress, particularly in modern
times with large staffs and a relatively high level of turnover, tend to
have less of a hands-on role in the selection process of their staff.112
Nonetheless, the content of “their personal staffs are entirely subject to
their discretion,”113 and partisan dedication matters greatly for choosing
these employees.114 As one anonymous member was quoted in
Whiteman as saying of his staff, “I rely on their judgment, and I have to
think that their judgment is attuned to my philosophy.”115 At the
Supreme Court, the nine Justices choose new clerks each year.
Although educational cues provide a bar for employment, other factors,
including previous clerkship experience and ideological similarity or
acquiescence, seem to be operational with at least some Justices.116
In each institution, although advisors tackle critical tasks and
arguably exert vast influence, they nearly uniformly do so out of sight.
Their employers were the ones elected or appointed to their positions,
and, as such, are the ones that serve in the public spotlight. Patterson,
for example, notes that when it comes to presidential power “it is the
men and women on the president’s personal staff who first channel that
power, shape it, focus it—and, on the president’s instructions, help him
wield it. . . . [Most of them] are nearly unknown—largely because it is
usually in the president’s interest to keep them out of sight.”117
The same is said to be true for the other branches, with the
anonymity of the job actually acting to foster a spirit of cooperation and

110. GARRISON, supra note 34, at 137.
111. Rudalevige, supra note 43, at 341.
112. See Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 38, at 393–94.
113. David L. Leal & Fredrick M. Hess, Who Chooses Experience? Examining the Use
of Veteran Staff by House Freshman, 36 POLITY 651, 655 (2004).
114. Romzek & Utter, supra note 11, at 1267.
115. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 35–36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 76, 102–03; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 49,
at 870–71.
117. PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 1.
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to reduce (but not eliminate entirely) incentives for shirking or selfpromotion.118
We, of course, are not the first to argue that the role of law clerks is
similar to that of other federal political advisors. Fox and Hammond
argue that “[t]he job of congressional aide, whether on a personal or
committee staff, is a peculiarly personal one—based on mutual trust,
confidence, and loyalty to a member. Analogous jobs in the Federal
government are the White House staff, personal assistants to
Presidential appointees, and clerks of judges.”119 Although it is
important to remember that our attempts to systematically test advisor
influence focus only on one stage at one political institution, we also
think that these efforts are nonetheless meritorious and provide insight
into the broader topic of advisor influence in politics. Although law
clerks, legislative advisors, and presidential staffers are different in
many ways, their similarities are salient enough to allow us to draw
preliminary conclusions about the presence of advisor influence and the
conditional nature of that influence across political branches based on
our findings regarding clerk influence at the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although future efforts are needed to generalize these findings across
the other branches of government, we have little reason to doubt that
advisor influence is any weaker for legislators and presidents—though it
might be more difficult to measure and document. As such, if taken
seriously and studied rigorously, the question of advisor influence over
political principals could lead to a more complete understanding of the
factors that affect political decision making.

118. See Christine DeGregario, Research Note, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress:
Committee Chairs and Senior Aides, 28 POLITY 261, 266 (1995); Romzek & Utter, supra note
11, at 1268.
119. FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 8, at 3.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1
Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates of Petition Certworthiness
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Variable

Variable Coding

Conflict Alleged

Did petitioner allege existence of
legal conflict? (0 = no, 1 = yes)

0.16
(0.20)

Conflict Present

Did pool memo determine that
alleged legal conflict existed? (0 =
no, 1 = yes)

2.65*
(0.20)

U.S. Seeks Review

Was U.S. petitioner in case or did it
submit an amicus brief seeking
review? (0 = no, 1 = yes)

1.89*
(0.26)

U.S. Opposes Review

Was U.S. respondent in case or did
it submit an amicus brief opposing
review (0 = no, 1 = yes)

-0.18
(0.21)

Dissent in Lower Court

Did one or more lower court judges
dissent from majority opinion in
court immediately below Supreme
Court? (0 = no, 1 = yes)

0.69*
(0.20)

Constitutional Petition

Did petitioner assert a violation of
his or her constitutional rights? (0 =
no, 1 = yes)

-0.08
(0.21)

Judicial Review
Exercised

Did court immediately below
Supreme Court exercise judicial
review by invalidating a law as being
unconstitutional? (0 = no, 1 = yes)

1.34*
(0.31)

Legal Salience

Did opinion of court immediately
below the Supreme Court receive
media coverage in the legal
periodical U.S. Law Week? (0 = no,
1 = yes)

0.35*
(0.19)
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Civil Liberties Petition

Did petition involve a civil liberties
issue?120 (0 = no, 1 = yes)

-0.17
(0.17)

Total Amicus Curiae
Briefs

How many amicus briefs were filed
either supporting or opposing the
petition?

0.36*
(0.09)

Constant

-2.08*
(0.21)

Observations

1100

Pseudo-R2

0.31

Note: The cell entries in the right column are maximum likelihood coefficients.
Standard errors, which appear in parentheses below each coefficient, are robust
standard errors.

120. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI.
66, 74 (2000).
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Appendix Table 2
Logistic Regression Parameter
Estimates of Clerk–Justice Voting Agreement

Variable

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Clerk Recommendation

-2.40
(0.18)

Certworthiness

-2.93*
(0.20)

Ideological Distance

-0.32*
(0.15)

Certworthy x Ideological
Distance

0.81*
(0.37)

Certworthy x Clerk
Recommendation

5.22*
(0.33)

Clerk Recommendation x
Ideological Distance

-1.15*
(0.35)

Certworthy x Recommendation x
Distance

-0.90
(0.60)

Justice Tenure

-0.004
(0.014)

Justice Fixed Effects
Justice Blackmun

2.50*
(0.29)

Justice Brennan

2.35*
(0.45)

Justice Ginsburg

3.19*
(0.73)

Justice Kennedy

2.47*
(0.11)

Justice Marshall

2.46*
(0.32)
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Justice O’Connor

2.28*
(0.15)

Justice Powell

2.50*
(0.29)

Justice Rehnquist

2.06*
(0.11)

Justice Scalia

2.39*
(0.14)

Justice Souter

2.46*
(0.15)

Justice Stevens

1.95*
(0.21)

Justice Thomas

2.59*
(0.19)

Justice White

1.53*
(0.39)

Observations

9531

Pseudo-R2

0.11

Note: The cell entries in the right column are maximum likelihood coefficients.
Standard errors, which appear in parentheses below each coefficient, are robust
standard errors. Because our model contains numerous interactive terms, this table
should not be used to assess either the statistical significance or substantive
magnitude of any variable except Justice Tenure, which is not statistically
significant. See Figures 1 and 2 and the accompany text above for interpretation of
these results. Complete Justice Fixed Effects were estimated by suppressing the
constant term, which means there is no baseline justice category. See Figure 3 and
accompanying text above for discussion of the substance of these results.
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